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Originally published by The New Indian Express, deleted without explanation.

MUMBAI: A district cooperative bank, which has Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) President Amit Shah as a director, netted the highest deposits among such banks of old Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes that were abruptly demonetised on November 8, 2016, according to RTI replies received by a Mumbai activist.

The Ahmedabad District Cooperative Bank (ADCB) secured deposits of Rs 745.59 crore of the spiked notes -- in just five days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the demonetisation announcement. All the district cooperative banks were banned from accepting deposits of the banned currency notes from the public after November 14, 2016, -- five days after demonetisation -- on fears that black money would be laundered through this route.

According to the bank's website, Shah continues to be a director with the bank and has been in that position for several years. He was also the bank's chairman in 2000. ADCB's total deposits on March 31, 2017, were Rs 5,050 crore and its net profit for 2016-17 was Rs 14.31 crore.

Right behind ADCB, is the Rajkot District Cooperative Bank, whose chairman Jayeshbhai Vitthalbhai Radadiya is a cabinet minister in Gujarat Chief Minister Vijay Rupani's government. It got deposits of old currencies worth Rs 693.19 crore.

Interestingly, Rajkot is the hub of Gujarat BJP politics -- Prime Minister Modi was first elected from there as a legislator in 2001.

ADC bank board of directors screenshot - click to enlarge.

Incidentally, the figures of Ahmedabad-Rajkot DCCBs are much higher than the apex Gujarat State Cooperative Bank Ltd, which got deposits of a mere Rs 1.11 crore.

"The amount of deposits made in the State Cooperative Banks (SCBs) and District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs) -- revealed under RTI for first time since demonetisation -- are astounding," Manoranjan S. Roy, the RTI activist who made the effort to get the information, told IANS.

The RTI information was given by the Chief General Manager and Appellate Authority, S. Saravanavel, of the National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (NABARD).

It has also come to light, through the RTI queries, that only seven public sector banks (PSBs), 32 SCBs, 370 DCCBs, and a little over three-dozen post offices across India collected Rs 7.91 lakh crore -- more than half (52 per cent) of the total amount of old currencies of Rs 15.28 lakh crore deposited with the RBI.

The break-up of Rs 7.91 lakh crore mentioned in the RTI replies shows that the value of spiked notes deposited with the RBI by the seven PSBs was Rs 7.57 lakh crore, the 32 SCBs gave in Rs 6,407 crore and the 370 DCCBs brought in Rs 22,271 crore. Old notes deposited by 39 post offices were worth Rs 4,408 crore.

Information from all the SCBs and DCCBs across India were received through the replies. The seven PSBs account for around 29,000 branches -- out of the over 92,500 branches of the 21 PSBs in India -- according to data published by the RBI. The 14 other PSBs declined to gave information on one ground or the other. There are around 155,000 post offices in the country.

Fifteen months after demonetisation, the government had announced that Rs 15.28 Lakh crore -- or 99 per cent of the cancelled notes worth Rs 15.44 lakh crore -- were returned to the RBI treasury.

Roy said it was a serious matter if only a few banks and their branches and a handful post offices, apart from SCBs and DCCBs, accounted for over half the old currency notes.

"At this rate, serious questions arise about the actual collection of spiked notes through the remaining 14 mega-PSBs, besides rural-urban banks, private banks (like ICICI, HDFC and others), local cooperatives, Jankalyan Banks and credit cooperatives and other entities with banking licenses, the figures of which are not made available under RTI," he said.

The SCBs were allowed to exchange or take deposits of banned notes till December 30, 2016 -- for a little over seven weeks, in contrast to district cooperative banks which were allowed only five days of transactions.

The prime minister during his demonetisation speech had said that Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes could be deposited in bank or post office accounts from November 10 till close of banking hours on December 30, 2016, without any limit. "Thus you will have 50 days to deposit your notes and there is no need for panic," he had said.

After an uproar, mostly from BJP allies, the government also opened a small window in mid-2017, during the presidential elections, allowing the 32 SCBs and 370 DCCBs -- largely owned, managed or controlled by politicians of various parties -- to deposit their stocks of the spiked notes with the RBI. The move was strongly criticised by the Congress and other major Opposition parties.

Among the SCBs, the Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank topped the list of depositors with Rs 1,128 crore from 55 branches and the smallest share of Rs 5.94 crore came from just five branches of Jharkhand State Cooperative Bank, according to the replies.

Surprisingly, the Andaman & Nicobar State Cooperative Bank's share (from 29 branches) was Rs 85.76 crore.

While Maharashtra has a population of 12 crore, Jharkhand's population is 3.6 crore. Andaman & Nicobar Islands have less than four lakh residents.

The poorest of all the cooperative banks in the country is Banki Central Cooperative Bank Ltd in Odisha, which admitted to receiving zero deposits of the spiked currency.

Of the total 21 PSBs, State Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, Bank of Maharashtra, Central Bank of India, Dena Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, Punjab & Sindh Bank, Vijaya Bank, Andhra Bank, Syndicate Bank, UCO Bank, United Bank of India, Oriental Bank of Commerce, and IDBI Bank (14 banks) -- with over 63,500 branches amongst them -- did not give any information on deposits.

4

The government began with focusing on fake currencies and black money as the reason for demonetisation. As deposits started rapidly piling in banks and it looked increasingly unlikely that there was a lot of black or fake money being caught, the goalposts started shifting.

Soon it became evident that the supply of legal notes was nowhere near adequate and worse, going by the capacity to print notes, it would take another 5 to 6 months to return the amount of money withdrawn from the country. Then came disclosures of problems with notes, inappropriate prioritization of the 2000 rupee note, which is available relatively abundantly, but without the intermediate 500 rupee notes, only serves to reduce the limited liquidity with the existing 14% of notes left to people.

Suddenly the talk seemed to turn to a cashless India. Government spokespersons on TV as well as Modi himself have given up all talk of black money and suddenly demonetisation is all about a cashless India (which got rapidly ridiculed with comparisons to the cash-less reality) and upgraded to a less-cash India. This is a terrible idea.

Necessity is not utility

If it were useful for India's sellers to accept cashless payments by paying a charge on the transactions, they would already be cashless. The government wouldn't have to recommend it at all. The fact is, cash transactions are highly efficient. They work instantaneously and reliably with no other infrastructure needed - bank accounts, devices, connectivity, electricity to run said devices.... and they are FAST. Taking a note or five from a wallet, handing it over, acceptig change back takes way less time than devices connecting, verifying, blah blah blah. Even swiping a card takes more time. AND unlike cash, you pay a fee every time it is used. Whether it is the buyer or seller charged, the cost will ensure the buyer pays for it. No seller is an idiot.

A few sellers may have adopted these methods in a bid to increase the business the government killed, but it is highly unlikely that they will prefer these methods to cash, if they hadn't found them useful before. A few businesses catering to buyers likely to own cards may continue, but that is an entirely different planet from cashless India.

To give a very crude example:

Bottom line is that cash works. Starving the country of cash will not work because hoarders will hoard and the government will have to issue adequate cash to keep country running. This kind of deprivation will in fact cause more people to hoard. A domestic example (I'm full of them) - before the demonetisation, I'd been a happy mostly cashless user for over a decade. I live in a small town and yet my maid and grocer are paid with online transfers by the month. I very rarely had any cash other than the notes in my wallet which usually ran out and I lived a day or two on simple credit if needed - since I had no daily expenses as such beyond vegetables. Today, I have over 10 thousand rupees in my drawer - because I know I need to pay the other maid (whom I hired merely because she was desperate) in cash in another week or so, but then people will be crowding to draw salaries. I have also kept enough cash at home, because unlike normal times, when I could hop over to an ATM and withdraw when I needed, there is no telling when I may find an ATM with a queue I'm willing to brave. This is happening everywhere. 20 days of banks giving out money the best they can, and our local market looks like this:

People aren't even thinking of spending. They will not spend on anything unnecessary, no matter how much cashless you scream, till they feel reassured that they have enough cash for contingencies. That is going to be a long, long way away.

Inadequate penetration of debit cards

India has 24.5 million debit cards, most of them saturated in urban areas, and people often owning several among those who do. My home for example has two adults and 8 debit cards between us. so 24.5 million being the number of cards is unlikely to be anywhere close to actual card users. Further, cash withdrawals at ATMs is most of the use these cards are put to with 88% of transactions and 94% of the total monetary value of all debit card use. Which brings us right back to cash.

Inadequate penetration and extreme difficulty obtaining credit cards

A few days after demonetisation was announced, I got a call from SBI offering me a credit card. The limit was to be from 30 thousand to a few lakh - I forget details. Interested, I agreed. Ignorant of the ways of credit card companies, I expected that they would estimate my limits by my salary or deposits, etc. Turned out that they blocked a fixed deposit and issued a credit card against it for less than the amount of the fixed deposit. Unclear why anyone would use a credit card at all instead of their debit card, in that case. I got several other offers. Curious about this phenomenon, I replied to the offers with varying information about my income. Unsurprisingly, I found that I had to be rich enough to be able to spend the money directly in order to be able to use it on credit at rates that would put a shady rural moneylender to shame. It makes no sense and I don't think I'll be using that card. I think this option of going cashless is irrelevant to most of India's population - other than the corporate salaried class - got more interest out of them if I said I worked in an MNC - which, let's face it, may be the loudest population of India, but hardly the top empoyment.

Online and mobile banking

Let me narrate here an incident in my home recently. My maid, who pays for her gas in cash and uses her debit card strictly to withdraw money from the ATM as needed, got an SMS from her gas provider saying that she could pay for the gas online. The conversation went something like this:

The fact of the matter is, online transactions are complex and to the internet illiterate are a financial catastrophe waiting to happen. It is far better for people to learn about internet security with Facebook accounts and verifications and email passwords and lost passwords and recovery and hacked Twitter accounts than to begin their internet experience with a high stakes gamble like the contents of their bank account because their government forced them to do it for survival.

Make no mistake, if people don't have cash and get taken in by this propaganda, very soon you are going to have operators of cyber cafes with passwords to a hell of a lot of accounts as aunties line up their with electricity bills and bank slips containing their login ID and passwords in hand to pay the bill so that their electricity is not disconnected or to charge their Paytm account so they can pay their grocer. And they would not have the knowledge of how to change their password either. They would learn eventually, likely with hard lessons that leave them with nothing to protect, and this is not the way to do it. Too much risk.

Literacy rate in India

India's literacy rate stands at 74.04% - but this is an illusion. A lot of "literate" people of poor economic status are barely able to read and rarely in English, which is currently required to transact efficiently online, understand bank statements, secure their accounts, change passwords and PINs and more. Some things like using cards or withdrawing cash from ATMs can be done in Hindi or other languages, but even examining transaction slips and more still happens in English. Internet banking is mostly in English.

Computer literacy is even lower. Smart phone usage may be slightly better, but it is still under 30% of the population.

Electrification and internet penetration in India

I am not even going to talk of percentages here. To go cashless, an absolutely uninterrupted electric supply and internet connectivity is non-negotiable. And, to put it very very mildly, we are nowhere near 100%

Business margins

Business margins over every single transaction are absurd replacement to freely exchanged cash. For high value and infrequent sales, it may make sense. To buy your vegetables, Paytm may earn more than the vegetable seller's profit at the end of the day. Tomatoes are selling at 10Rs a kilo. One kilo is a hell of a lot of tomatoes.

Business readiness

Twitter is currently awash with stories of cashless fails. I had one yesterday. I couldn't find my debit card, so rather than risk it being stolen and misused, I blocked it. Five minutes later I found it. But while I can block it online, I cannot unblock it using the same security available to my entire bank account with access to online banking. If a thief has access to online banking, they don't need to unblock cards, they can simply transfer all the funds out. The bank has my phone, my email AND my access to online banking secured with passwords and OTP, yet something as simple as unblocking a card can't be done within minutes of blocking it and I must go to my home branch 2 hours away. If the card got blocked by someone while trying to pay after two hours of filling a shopping cart, would be a really fantastic cashless experience! This is the country's biggest bank!

If I was in a city and living cashless as Modi recommends, what was I to do? Beg for money to get home in spite of having plenty? Banks like Bank of Baroda or Indian Overseas Bank don't allow online generation of PIN for ATM cards - you must go to the home branch. How is a cashless India even possible with the biggest jugglers of money being so primitive?

Other issues like Paytm account blocking in the event of a lost phone being completely abusrd, to inexperienced sellers charging over a lakh rupees instead of over a thousand rupees accidentally and not knowing how to reverse charges. There are plenty of nightmare stories.

Security issues

Internet banking is a lucrative area for hackers, and India is not extraordinary on security. Just weeks before the demonetisation was announced, an ATM hack had defrauded many people of their money. While banks blocked cards and issued new ones, there is no information on any investigation or arrests made. Or, for that matter, for most cyber crimes beyond "objectionable" content on social media, which is usually busted because of a lack of anonymity - a newbie mistake, no hacker into financial systems will make.

There are security issues with banking apps

I'm just going to paste this here.

 

Forget cashless India. Go pre-dawn to some ATM that gives out Rs 2000 notes - they have shorter queues. Do this a few days and you'll have some cash to use till this nightmare is done.

8

As soon as the demonetisation of Rs.500 and Rs.1000 notes was announced, I had said that it was a forced and public funded "bailout" of banks. This article examines news reports from the last year and explains how I arrived at the conclusion.

Please note: I am not an economist or banker or accountant or even particularly good with money or calculations. As a result, almost all the conclusions in this article are actually quoted from news reports and analysis. I have merely strung them together. I could still be wrong, feel free to argue in the comments.

As soon as the demonetisation of Rs.500 and Rs.1000 notes was announced, I had said that it was a forced and public funded "bailout" of banks. This is a phenomenon polite people call recapitalization unless the government literally dumps money into banks.

This view has not changed. But many are skeptical, saying that excessive money with banks is not good for them as they will have to lend it out in order to earn from it. That is true, and they will have to lower interests and give out more loans and such. However, to those following the news, I'm simply presenting various things that happened in the year before the demonetisation. Particularly with regard to the Non Performing Assets - NPAs. Too many NPAs and the banks won't be able to function. On the other hand... pay attention here: The bank with the largest number of NPAs - State Bank of India - doesn't seem to be in as much crisis as several others - say... Indian Overseas Bank - guess why? Because with that size come plenty of other performing assets as well as deposits keeping the show going.

For the record, it isn't the first time that the government has forced the country into actions that end up putting money in banks. The Jan Dhan Yojana was the first. It doesn't seem to have yielded much. Then came the DBTL, where in spite of the Supreme Court saying that citizens must not be deprived of their rights because of not having an Aadhaar, a convoluted scheme was imposed on them where the gas subsidies provided for the state would be provided as deposits into their bank accounts as opposed to people paying less for gas while buying it. Small amounts at a time, but it would end up totaling to a good amount of money belonging to citizens getting deposited into the banks by the government. People were free to withdraw it, but at least some of it would hopefully remain as deposited, just like some Jan Dhan accounts would indeed see use even if most remained empty. But these are old stories.

The NPAs of banks had increased to an alarming level by the end of the December quarter, last year. Then governor of RBI, Raghuram Rajan had been on the case of banks for NPAs for a while, and took a firm view of the matter, giving the banks until March 2017 to deal with their NPAs. Banks were to start flagging and resolving NPAs and restructured loans and by March, skeletons were tumbling out of banking closets and it was clear that the banks had been underplaying NPAs in order to show better results to investors (presumably). With the pressure on from the RBI, the banks started turning the heat on defaulters. It is no secret that it is banks with large corporate loans struggling the worst with NPAs, and I can only speculate that people who knew people who knew people had a lot of money at stake. To quote from the linked article:

RBI had conducted an asset quality review of Indian banks and found many accounts that were showing stress were required to be classified as non-performing. But since banks were not classifying those accounts as NPA, the banking regulator directed lenders to classify them as sub-standard and provide accordingly. Sub-standard assets attract 15-20 per cent provisioning as compared to five per cent provisioning requirement in standard assets.

RBI had asked the banks to complete the exercise of classifying assets as NPA in the third and fourth quarter.

As a result, many banks including the likes of Bank of Baroda, IDBI Bank, Bank of India suffered record losses in the Oct-Dec quarter. Since the remaining accounts (those which were not classified as NPA in Q3), need to be classified as NPA in Q4, losses could her mount. Bankers said this has prompted the banks to call the management of the defaulting companies and ask them to make payments, which will help the lenders avoid further losses.

Incidentally, this is around the time when Narendra Modi claims that planning for demonetisation started (although there doesn't seem to be much evidence of planning going by the manner in which it has been carried out).

Soon after this began noises of Raghuram Rajan not continuing as the governor of RBI after his tenure was complete. What happened behind scenes is anyone's guess and rumors and claims out in public range from Raghuram Rajan not wanting to continue to the government not wanting him to continue. Regardless, he was succeeded by Urjit Patel, who headed GSPC in Modi's Gujarat when GSPC took loans to the tune of 20,000 crore and basically had nothing to show for them, with no gas ever being produced. His closeness to Ambani (who profited majorly from the GSPC mess) as well as Jignesh Patel is well known. So, given Modi's preference for complete incompetence in area where competence is expected being a requisite for appointments, who better than Urjit Patel to head RBI while it was overseeing banks reducing NPAs?

Unlike Raghuram Rajan's approach, where the RBI would support banks in dealing with bad loans, Urjit Patel was of the view that "bad banks" take over the debt. It is unclear what happened of that approach or whether and what efforts continued toward NPAs, but they continued to rise. Attempts by Modi (and one wonders why Modi) to get Indian state owned firms to take over floundering defaulting companies (and their debt) failed a month before demonetisation was declared by Modi. To quote from the link:

India's government is pushing state-owned steel, power and shipping firms to take over assets of private companies that have defaulted on loans, but faces resistance from them, leaving it scrambling to clear a $135 billion pile of stressed loans from banks' books.

[...]

Last month, steel ministry officials met with Modi to outline measures to revive a sector reeling under bad loans and cheap Chinese imports. Days later, in a renewed push, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley met with top lenders, including State Bank of India (SBI.NS) and ICICI Bank (ICBK.NS), steel and shipping ministry officials and some state-owned companies.

He gave the state-owned firms a list of 23 troubled steel, power and shipping companies with bad loans totaling $14.5 billion, according to government officials and minutes of the meeting seen by Reuters.

The state-owned firms were "encouraged" to buy at least one asset and take a minority stake in a company on the list.

The banks needed lots of money and fast, or many of them being Public Sector Banks with the government owning more than half of them, it would stress the government for funds. One wonders what was wrong with turning the screws on NPAs harder. The banks needed money and fast.

How could this be achieved? Well, how about if all the people in India put most of the money they had into banks and left most of it there?

What followed, with demonetisation seems to be a harebrained scheme to get most of the cash with the country into banks. This is how not only do the banks not have enough cash planned and are not even in a position to provide enough cash in the near future, we have increasing noises about "cashless" transactions being an intent behind the demonetisation. So the money gets transferred from account to account, but remains with the banks instead of returning to the people with limits withdrawn and notes available again.

Then with demonetisation with banks bloated with funds, some of the staggering NPAs were "written off" to reduce their burden and free the money the banks would have to provision for the bad loans. Any taxes the government got would be a bonus (but given the expenses and waivers of demonetisation, I doubt these were the real motive).

Added feedback from someone who knows more about money than me: While the increased deposits will allow the banks to lend more, earn more, lower interest rates, etc, the interest earned by the banks and taxes to the government will no doubt be useful toward recapitalizing the banks. As will various confiscations of deposits be.

So now the thoughtless demonetisation with it unending new rules being pulled out of hats has happened. Banks have a different problem. Too much cash. And the methods to deal with it won't necessarily result in big profits for them. What they will do to existing loans with the economy and thus borrowers stressed far worse is anyone's guess.

Finally, how do I know that this is really a bank bailout and not a coincidence? Well, now that things are going south with the demonetisation, the usual process of protecting Modi from the consequences of his own action has already begun. From being "Freedom at Midnight" - Modi's project planned meticulously and in complete and necessary secrecy for 10 months, the story now is that the RBI and Finance Ministry presented the demonetisation plan to Modi in a manner that "turning down the scheme was out of the question". And guess why (emphasis mine):

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is working “more than ten hours a day” just on ensuring that the 8 November money measures announced by him ensure a smooth landing for the economy rather than turbulence. This despite the fact that the plan actually owed its origin to the Reserve Bank of India and the Ministry of Finance, who persuaded the PM to go forward with an idea which will affect (and has affected) over a billion citizens of this country. Prime Minister Modi showed moral courage in coming forward and accepting ownership of the currency swap scheme announced on 8 November, and has since then publicly backed every twist and turn in that policy by the monetary and fiscal authorities. Senior officials say “Prime Minister Modi was presented with the issue in such a way that turning down the scheme was out of the question”. Through the plan, concerned officials wished to “shield those in high positions in banks across the country from the consequences of the crony-oriented lending that they had been doing, specially since 2006”, the year when Narasimha Rao’s liberalisation policy was fully substituted by the UPA into a faux Nehruvian economic policy that combined Fabian socialism with Wall Street ways. “Officials argued that a windfall of up to Rs 550,000 crore would flow to the banks through the enforced extinguishing of currency notes issued by the RBI, and that this would recapitalise several banks that were in effect bankrupt, thereby allowing them to lend again”. The Prime Minister was assured that “steps would be taken to ensure that the common man suffered minimal discomfort” and that “the informal economy would accelerate its absorption into the formal without jobs being affected”. It needs to be mentioned that it is the formal sector that is responsible for not repaying bank loans of a value crossing Rs 750,000 crore, which will be several times the value of tax evasion by the informal sector. NPAs are being written off by banks at an accelerating pace over the past six years, with still more businesses declaring themselves unviable by the month.

I rest my case.

22

The earthquake in Sikkim on the 18th September 2011 has created massive devastation. North Sikkim has been destroyed on a massive scale. This is a time to use your vacation time and money to go to Sikkim with help in your heart.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfEbt0x_bZI

The destruction has dwarfed the constant pouring of money and effort into rescue and rehabilitation and many people are still to receive assistance.

With thousands of homes obliterated, and winter around the corner, the goal of rehabilitation is challenging and overwhelmingly large.

Last night, yet another smaller earthquake rocked the region.

In the midst of all this, rescue workers are fighting to save lives.

Many Indians are generously asking for where they can donate, but there is more that can be done. It isn't just about money, it is about getting work done. Consider trying to see what all you can do, rather than think of how much money you can give alone.

Presenting here the needs, the organizations on the ground that can be supported with money, supplies and labour.

Donations for Sikkim

Principal Resident Commissioner, Office nos. 26115013/ 26113747/26883026.

Principal Resident Commissioner, Sikkim House, Delhi; contact: 9968846087.

Office of Resident Commissioner Delhi may also be approached for delivery of relief items.

 

Sikkim govt contact nos. 03592-201664 (O), 03592-202932 (F).

Relief items may be dispatched to BK Kharel, Secy, Land revenue-cum-relief commissioner.

State Bank of Sikkim, Gangtok, CM's Relief Fund A/C 464, main branch.

 

For donations from outside Sikkim: IFSC-Central bank of India No. 282310 main branch.

Donate to USFC & Sikkim Express relief fund at Bank of Baroda (a/c no 24950100005733).

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SEWA

To donate in rupees

Sewa International
49, Deendayal Upadhyaya Marg,
New Delhi -110002, India
Tel: +91 11 23232850 or 23684445
Email: sewainternationaldelhi {at] gmail (dot) com

 

International donations:
Sewa USA Online donations Click here
IDRF Online donations Click here
Sewa UK, Online donations Click here

Payable to “Sewa International” and send detail to:
Sewa International USA
PO Box 14622
Fremont, CA 94539

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Rotary Club of Gangtok South/E D Fund - Donations of money
Raman Shresta - 973310230 (Sikkim)

Bank - Indian Overseas Bank
Branch - Gangtok , Kazi Road
Ac NO - 547
IFSC Code - IOBA0001624
MICR Code - 737020001

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The Sikkim Chamber of Commerce - Cash or Kind

Karma Bhutia at +919434094359 or Ashok Sarda at +919733015188

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The Bar Association of Sikkim - 18th September Earthquake Relief Fund - Cash or Kind

Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, General Secretary 9933355335.

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Sikkim Earthquake Relief - Switzerland - Cash

Account No: 45-82171-8
IBAN: CH0509000000450821718
BIC: POFICHBEXXX
Swiss Post – PostFinance
Nordring 8
CH-3030 Bern

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Vibrant Foundations - Mumbai and Gangtok(Sikkim), NJP and Siliguri - arrange to send cash, relief materials etc to the crisis ridden locations.

WE HOWEVER CANNOT INCUR ANY EXPENDITURE OF ANY KIND.

SHANTANU BARAT 9769584418

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United Sikkim Football Club and Sikkim Express Relief Fund

Account number is - 24950100005733

Bank of Baroda.

RTGS BARB0GANGTO Bank Code 012

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Volunteers

SIKKIM

Raman Shresta - 9733102304
Pema Leyda Shangderpa - 9800081110
Pema Tsewang Topgyal Serdup
Manish Raj Shrestha -
Naresh Raj Shrestha - 9434169663
Pema Wangchuk Dorjee - 9832080753
Bjorn De Niese - 9232855009
Rimp Dorjee - 9733005567
Karchoong - 9800871277
Bhanu Pratap Rasaily - 9733012222
Varsha Shrestha - 9593782847
Jashoda Chettri - 9434384636
Anna Linkit Foning - 7872888083
Mita Zulca - 9593971250
Sarikah Atreya - 9733259520
Mita Zulca - 9593971250

Mumbai:

Vineeta Rao - 9820409208
Amit Mundra - 9820724205/8976099921

Bangalore:

Neeraj Verma - 9845402227 (not available from 10:00 AM to 6:00PM)
Rosina Poudyal - 9739096047

Delhi:

Aekta Chander - 9811471732

Pune:

Shaliya Khan - 9890171116

Hyderabad:

Dipesh Pradhan - 8179469023

Goa:

Nandita Oberoi Sharma - 9011056602

UK

Ashila Wangdi - 0044 7506734889
Karma Wangdi - 0044 7947960712

Dubai (UAE)

Niraj Gurung +971551874483 and +971508821432

Singapore

Tshering Bhutia - +65 90794152.

USA

Naresh Agarwal - +1 617 553 4461 (Boston Area)
Sonam Ongmu - +1 415 990 6180/solasopa@phhp.ufl.edu (Gainesville, Florida)

Canada

Yishey Choden- +1 416 834 5687 yishey@gmail.com

Switzerland

Jenny Bentley -