<link rel="stylesheet" href="//fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans%3A400italic%2C700italic%2C400%2C700">Tor Archives « Aam JanataSkip to content

3

internet_115634I think TOR's hidden services are dismissed too easily. They are a quick access to "anyone can host their own site" "anyone can have their own domain" and "hey, let's have fun!". I think more people should use TOR to host their own sites for free - decentralized is the future of the internet, though TOR can be slow (better connectivity is changing a lot of things).

While undoubtedly there are some really creepy hidden services on the TOR deep web, there are certain sites that are fascinating too. I also like using TOR features, rather than only using it as an exit node - mainly because I rarely do anything that needs obfuscation, and my regular use urls haven't gotten blocked.... yet.

So, if you have become sick of the clichéd bookmarks with the same few sites and forums and directories, here is yet another list - but this is my bookmarks. I am not intending to be comprehensive at all. I am simply sharing .onion bookmarks from my browser. Sites I enjoyed visiting (sorry, no arms dealers and drug sources - you should go start at the Hidden Wiki or something) - in no particular sequence.

How to Exit the Matrix - a comprehensive document about the police state and the individuals right to privacy that includes systematic information on how to become untraceable on the internet.

Beneath VT - Tunnels under Virginia Tech - this site describes (illegal - trespassing) explorations of steam tunnels under Virginia Tech. It is fairly fascinating. If you liked famous five as a kid, you'll like this one now.

ReddiTor - if you love redit for its irreverent discussions, you'll love redditor - Reddit on the deep web. What do people say, when they don't have to worry about their identities and how they look saying what they really feel? For example, see Reddit onions on the web and ReddiTor onions on TOR.

Tormail - your email address may look like you@tormail.org, but you can access it only as a hidden site. Safer, anonymous and supports email clients. Send and receive emails with complete privacy.

Wikileaks mirror as a hidden site. This one was working when most else was under attack. It still works. The same with The Pirate Bay.

Stranger than fiction: Examines the WTC terrorist attack on 9/11 and meanders through history examining the Jewish control and use of the US for its own ends. Uses extensive references. Still haven't gotten around to verifying it all, but a fascinating read nonetheless. This is one of the many fascinating documents archived in The TOR Library.

There are many libraries. I think people just share books they have as a service. (no clue on copyright scenario). Here is a library of books on Anarchy.

FreeFor is a place for pseudonomous meetings with secure and varied communications and like minded people (hopefully). This includes the brilliant idea of making public keys for encrypted/signed emails available on an .onion site itself.

And so on... I am currently running a test server on my laptop with a liquid feedback installation for Pirate Party India. It is a still developing software that aims to facilitate the process of decision making in a democratic manner by organizing the views of a large number of people - which is very difficult to do and people get overlooked under normal circumstances. We are hoping that if this works, it will aid the process of making sure citizen voices get heard.

If you enjoyed this list and found it useful... I guess I can search my bookmarks better 🙂

 

Note: You will not be able to see these links without downloading and installing TOR. An alternative is to add ".to" to the url, and see it on the website onion.to - which serves as a proxy for seeing .onion sites. So blahblahblahblah.onion would become bllahblahblahblah.onion.to - and you will be able to see it from a normal browser.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FBI seizes server providing anonymous remailer and many other services from colocation facility.

Contacts:

  • Riseup Networks, Devin Theriot-Orr, 206-708-8740, sunbird@riseup.net
  • May First/People Link, Jamie McClelland, 917-509-5734, jm@mayfirst.org
  • ECN: Isole Nella Rete, inr@riseup.net

Attack on Anonymous Speech

On Wednesday, April 18, at approximately 16:00 Eastern Time, U.S. Federal authorities removed a server from a colocation facility shared by Riseup Networks and May First/People Link in New York City. The seized server was operated by the European Counter Network (“ECN”), the oldest independent internet service provider in Europe, who, among many other things, provided an anonymous remailer service, Mixmaster, that was the target of an FBI investigation into the bomb threats against the University of Pittsburgh.

“The company running the facility has confirmed that the server was removed in conjunction with a search warrant issued at the request of the FBI,” said May First/People Link director Jamie McClelland. “The server seizure is not only an attack against us, but an attack against all users of the Internet who depend on anonymous communication.”

Disrupted in this seizure were academics, artists, historians, feminist groups, gay rights groups, community centers, documentation and software archives and free speech groups. The server included the mailing list “cyber rights” (the oldest discussion list in Italy to discuss this topic), a Mexican migrant solidarity group, and other groups working to support indigenous groups and workers in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In total, over 300 email accounts, between 50-80 email lists, and several other websites have been taken off the Internet by this action. None are alleged to be involved in the anonymous bomb threats. The seized machine did not contain any riseup email accounts, lists, or user data. Rather, the data belonged to ECN.

“The FBI is using a sledgehammer approach, shutting down service to hundreds of users due to the actions of one anonymous person,” said Devin Theriot-Orr, a spokesperson for Riseup. “This is particularly misguided because there is unlikely to be any information on the server regarding the source of the threatening emails.”

“We sympathize with the University of Pittsburgh community who have had to deal with this frightening disruption for weeks. We oppose such threatening actions. However, taking this server won’t stop these bomb threats. The only effect it has is to also disrupt e-mail and websites for thousands of unrelated people,” continues Mr. Theriot-Orr. “Furthermore, the network of anonymous remailers that exists is not harmed by taking this machine. So we cannot help but wonder why such drastic action was taken when authorities knew that the server contained no useful information that would help in their investigation.”

The FBI purportedly seized the server because it was hosting an anonymous remailer called Mixmaster. Anonymous remailers are used to send email anonymously, or pseudonymously. Like other anonymizing services such as the Tor network, these remailers are widely used to protect the identity of human rights activists who place themselves and their families in grave danger by reporting information about abuses. Remailers are also important for corporate whistle blowers, democracy activists working under repressive regimes, and others to communicate vital information that would otherwise go un-reported.

The Mixmaster software is specifically designed to make it impossible for anyone to trace the emails. The system does not record logs of connections, details of who sent messages, or how they were routed. This is because the Mixmaster network is specifically designed to resist censorship, and support privacy and anonymity. Unfortunately, some people misuse the network. However, compared to the rate of legitimate use, the abuse rate is very low. There is therefore no legitimate purpose for the FBI to seize this server because they will not be able to obtain any information about the sender. This is plainly extra-judicial punishment and an attack on free speech and anonymity on the internet and serves as a chilling effect on others providers of anonymous remailers or other anonymous services.

In absence of any other leads, the FBI needs to show that they are making progress in this case, and this has meant seizing a server so they can proudly demonstrate they are taking some action. But what this incident shows is they are grasping at straws and are willing to destroy innocent bystanders for the sake of protecting their careers.

About the organizations involved

MayFirst/People Link (mayfirst.org) is a politically-progressive member-run and controlled organization that redefines the concept of “Internet Service Provider” in a collective and collaborative way. May First/People Link’s members are organizers and activists who elect a Leadership Committee to direct the organization. Like a coop, members pay dues, buy equipment and then share that equipment for websites, email, email lists, and other Internet purposes.

Riseup Networks (riseup.net) provides online communication tools for people and groups working on liberatory social change. Riseup creates democratic alternatives and practices self-determination by controlling our own secure means of communications.

ECN (European Counter Network – ecn.org) is the oldest independent service provider in Europe providing free email accounts, mailing lists, and websites to organizations, activists, and movements that are involved in human rights, freedom of speech and information in Italy and Europe. ECN is anti-fascist and works towards a just and equal society. Years ago, before sites like Youtube and Vimeo existed, ECN created a platform called NGV where people could upload and share independent video of human rights violations. Nowadays ECN works primarily with anti-fascist and anti-Nazi movements in all of Europe, providing space and resources to political and social centers.

Questions / further reading

Q: Doesn’t Mixmaster/anonymous remailers enable criminals to do bad things?

A: Criminals can already do bad things. Since they’re willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than mixmaster provides. They can steal cell phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of literally millions of Windows machines around the world.

Mixmaster aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that.

Some advocates of anonymity explain that it’s just a tradeoff — accepting the bad uses for the good ones — but there’s more to it than that. Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims (identify theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand, don’t have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds.

So yes, criminals could in theory use mixmaster, but they already have better options, and it seems unlikely that taking mixmaster away from the world will stop them from doing bad things. At the same time, mixmaster and other privacy measures can fight identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on. Please see the tor FAQ on abuse for more information.

Q: How does Mixmaster / Anonymous remailers work?

A: Anonymous remailers work by connecting to other anonymous remailers in a chain, and every one in that chain removes the mail header information making it impossible to find the real sender.The Tor project maintains a list of typical users of this and other anonymity systems, and theMixmaster home page