In October 2017, the Jharkhand Government introduced a Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) pilot for the Public Distribution System (PDS) in Nagri – a block on the outskirts of Ranchi. Instead of rice at Re 1 per kg at the ration shop, the PDS cardholders are to receive the subsidy (calculated at Rs 31.60 per kg) in their bank account, and they buy rice at the ration shop at Rs 32.60 per kg. If this pilot succeeds, the Jharkhand government plans to extend it across the state.
A recent survey in Nagri, however, found that that 97 per cent of the sample households opposed the DBT pilot. Their unhappiness – indeed anger – with the DBT system is not hard to understand. In January 2018, about 25 per cent of cardholders did not receive the cash. Even those who get money face many hurdles. Many households do not know which of their bank accounts is being credited with DBT money (the sample households had 3.5 bank accounts on average). They are often constrained to make multiple trips to the bank to find out if the money has come, as most of them do not receive SMS alerts. Some banks even disallow cardholders from withdrawing money (claiming that the amounts are too small), forcing them to make further trips to the local Pragya Kendra or banking correspondents, where they often have to pay bribes. The entire process leads to a huge waste of time and money for the cardholders. It is especially cumbersome for the elderly, the disabled, and those who find it difficult to take time off work.
All this is in addition to the hassles of Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA), rampant across Jharkhand. ABBA applies at the Pragya Kendra and ration shop. It is far from clear what purpose DBT serves when ABBA is in place at the ration shop.
PDS dealers, too, are inconvenienced by the DBT system as they now have to spend much more time to distribute grain and have to handle about Rs 4-5 lakhs worth of cash every month.
Nagri is the latest in a series of unsuccessful DBT pilots. As per NITI Ayog’s surveys of DBT pilots in Chandigarh, Puducherry and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, this system is more expensive to access PDS entitlements. These surveys also found that over time a small proportion of cardholders stopped receiving the cash subsidy. While these pilots allowed cardholders to buy food items from the market, in Nagri people are restricted to purchase grain from the PDS shop. A DBT pilot also failed in Kasba block of Purnia district (Bihar), though further details of this experiment are not available.
Jharkhand has amongst the highest levels of hunger and undernutrition in the country and the PDS there is a lifeline for many rural households. It may be recalled that lakhs of ration cards not linked with Aadhaar were deleted in Jharkhand last year. In the last five months, seven starvation deaths were reported in Jharkhand. Five of them were due to the mandatory integration of PDS with Aadhaar.
A padyatra will be taking place from Nagri to Ranchi on 26 February, to demand the discontinuation of the DBT pilot. This protest is jointly organized by five opposition parties (Communist Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India (ML), Indian National Congress, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and Jharkhand Vikas Morcha) and several social movements and networks (Right to Food Campaign Jharkhand, Adivasi Moolvasi Astitva Raksha Manch, All India People’s Forum Jharkhand, United Mili Forum, All India Kisan Sabha, Jharkhand Jan Sanskriti Manch, Ekta Parishad, Bagaicha, Jharkhand Nagrik Prayas and others).
For further information please contact Akash Ranjan (9931014008) or Ankita Aggarwal (9504091005) or write at rtfcindia@gmail.com. Follow on Twitter: #RationBachao.
Linking Aadhaar to bank accounts is a recipe for creating benami[2] bank accounts and scaling benami bank transactions. It threatens to destroy your bank accounts and destroy the country’s banking system. It’s devastating that the integrity of banking processes is being destroyed by dividing, outsourcing and privatising processes integral to core banking so that they become the responsibility of no one.
Linking Aadhaar[1] to bank accounts is a recipe for creating benami[2] bank accounts and scaling benami bank transactions. It threatens to destroy your bank accounts and destroy the country’s banking system. It’s devastating that the integrity of banking processes is being destroyed by dividing, outsourcing and privatising processes integral to core banking so that they become the responsibility of no one.
Destroying the banking system
India’s Department of Revenue (DoR) has done it again.
On June 1, 2017 vide Notification №2/F .No. P.12011/11/2016-ES Cell-DOR it mandates the linking of every bank account with an Aadhaar number before December 31, 2017. While lawyers point out several illegalities, including the scope, of the notification of this subordinate legislation under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), the failure of the DoR to consistently protect national interest is unbelievable.
A few days back a co-panelist on a TV channel defended the DoR arguing that linking Aadhaar to Bank Accounts will weed out money laundering by verifying bank accounts. What my co-panelist did not say is money laundering is facilitated by creating benami accounts. It is also facilitated by benami transactions. Nor did my co-panelist explain how benami accounts happen or how benami transactions are scaled by money-launderers.
This latest notification ensures that the Trojan horse that they instilled into the banking system on January 27, 2011, will destroy the Indian economy along with the Indian banking system. As feared by the Reserve Bank of India before January 2011, Aadhaar is yet the best state sponsored enabling mechanism for money launderers to enable benami bank accounts. Aadhaar can even help the money launderer to take over your bank accounts. Aadhaar is also the enabler to scale benami transactions.
Here are just 5 ways in which linking the Aadhaar to PAN[3] or a bank account will hurt you, destroy India and, for those who care, an explanation of how Aadhaar creates benami bank accounts and scales benamitransactions.
The innocent will lose money, reputation and access to justice, dignity and livelihood
One, the innocent will lose money, reputation and access to justice, dignity and livelihood as their Aadhaar numbers can act as mules for money laundering, their subsidy and other Aadhaar enabled payments can be easily compromised, their access to their own bank accounts be denied, or they can be framed for economic offences. Helpless citizens and businesses may also find themselves at the receiving end of covert human rights violations as even their access to money and existence is disabled by deactivation or blocking of Aadhaar leaving no recourse to survival.
Linking Aadhaar to bank accounts or PAN converts India into the new tax haven for money launderers
Two, linking Aadhaar to bank accounts or PAN converts India into the new tax haven for money launderers as it becomes easy to remotely create benamiaccounts and operate benami transactions while claiming complete legitimacy. This will destroy India’s economy and governance.
Financing crime and terrorism will grow uncontrollably
Three, financing crime and terrorism will grow uncontrollably as it becomes increasingly difficult to discover, report or close down such operations. This will make it impossible to ensure national security as the rule of law is destroyed.
Corruption will increase
Four, corruption will increase as it becomes easier when proceeds will not be traceable to the corrupt. It will be increasingly difficult to restore swarajya and impossible to ensure suraiya.
Banks will not be able to contain non-performing-assets
Five, banks will not be able to contain non-performing-assets, fraud and financial misappropriation as the real users of banking services will be untraceable. The economy will be completely out of control as the black and white economies become indistinguishable.
We are in a policy vacuum as the NITI Aayog and the bureaucracy have failed to recognise the Trojan horse and protect national interest. Unless the RBI de-licenses the payments systems based on Aadhaar (AEPS) immediately and the government stays linking Aadhaar to PAN and bank accounts, our leadership will have failed to protect India from this fast colonisation of India by the private interests driving Aadhaar.
Enabling Benami Bank Accounts
Benami accounts get created when banks fail to identify the real customers who own the accounts. The Panama Papers exposed data of thousands of benami accounts created through a Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca. The Panama Papers exposed one modus operandi of hiding the real owners of the assets in tax havens.
The use of Aadhaar as KYC for bank accounts is similar to the note from Panama Law Firm Mossack Fonseca saying “they are an honest client”
Prudent bankers recognise the importance of knowing who they bank with. It is no wonder that the RBI had warned, right from before the Trojan horse was instilled in to the RBI in 2011, that the Aadhaar enrolment process does not have due diligence. It pointed out that for Aadhaar enrolment verification is not compulsory, as confirmed by the UIDAI in the Demographic Data Standards and Verification Procedure, and does not require document based verification.
The RBI also highlighted that such use of Aadhaar as third party identification is against Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the paper issued on Customer Due Diligence (CDD) for banks by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and circulated to scheduled commercial banks by the RBI on November 29, 2004.
The RBI also observed that a fixed time document like the Aadhaar cannot be a Proof of Address. It further cautioned using Business Correspondents (BC), to open bank accounts or undertake banking transactions, as the vulnerability of the system has not been tested and co-mingling funds of different banks in the hands of BC’s was a major operational risk to the banks. While resisting the use of Aadhaar, the RBI also highlighted the Government’s concern about the perceived misuse of such accounts for terrorist financing.
Under pressure from the UIDAI and the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, the RBI, through its circular dated January 27, 2011, allowed bank accounts to be opened exclusively on the basis of Aadhaar number. However the RBI required such accounts to be put to restrictions and be subjected to conditions and limitations prescribed for small accounts.
Not happy with the restrictions, the UIDAI pressed the RBI to lift the restrictions placed on accounts opened with Aadhaar numbers under the PMLA. On September 28, 2011, again through the Department of Revenue, the UIDAI succeeded in getting the RBI to backtrack and suspend the restrictions of the PMLA on bank accounts opened solely through Aadhaar. The UIDAI also succeeded in causing the RBI further to accept eKYC or remotely using information associated with an Aadhaar number as KYC. According to the UIDAI eKYC brings scale to the ease of onboarding customers.
To put the problem in perspective, Aadhaar enrolment was completely outsourced to private parties by the UIDAI with the sole aim of building the worlds largest biometric database. Mr. Nilekani’s UIDAI repeatedly emphasised that they merely provided a framework to issue a number and store the (unverified and unaudited) data.
UIDAI admits that the Aadhaar (UID) database has never been verified or audited
Without a verification and audit Aadhaar enables duplicates and ghosts
No one in the Aadhaar enrolment process was required to identify anyone. At best they had to merely verify documents that were submitted for enrolment. Needless to say anyone in possession of your documents could enrol with minor changes in any demographic information or with different biometrics. Field stories of enrolments are replete with descriptions of biometric jugaad including using combination of persons, use of biometric masks, biometric modifications, and other ingenious methods to maximise registrations.
According to the IT Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad, 34,000 operators who tried to make fake Aadhaar Cards have been blacklisted. Even if each operator worked for a year before being blacklisted, at about 100 cards a day amounts to over a billion cards. That is more than 95 percent of the database. The Aadhaar enrolment has been unlike that of any other identity document, easily scaling the creation of duplicate and ghost identities.
Excrept of IT Minister Ravi Shanker Prasad’s reply in Rajya Sabha on April 10, 2017
While there is widespread belief that biometric authentication at time of opening a bank account prevents benami, it ignores the field realities of mobile phone SIM cards being issued on Aadhaar photocopies and used to open bank accounts, of having remotely “downloadable” accounts, and also plain simple use of photocopies of Aadhaar or parallel Aadhaar databases to open bank accounts. With Aadhaar, banks do not have any trace of the real customer. The real customer is simply masked by a benami owner using an Aadhaar number. Even your Aadhaar can be used, without your knowledge, by a perpetrator to open multiple accounts in order to use it to collect bribes, park black money, or siphon your subsidies. In the eyes of law enforcement, if these accounts are discovered, you will be the criminal.
Is Aadhaar the new Panama?
To compound the problem, UIDAI has no liability for benami bank accounts opened with Aadhaar. After the introduction of the Aadhaar to open bank accounts, the accounts and deposits have doubled in 5 years. No one knows who really controls these accounts.
Growth of bank accounts and deposits in India
Enabling Benami transactions
Even when it had no mandate to develop banking platforms, in 2009, the UIDAI signed an MoU with the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), a non government company, to develop an Aadhaar Enabled Payment System (AEPS). In this MoU the UIDAI has no responsibility for your banking transactions and the NPCI has no obligation to the RBI. The payment system uses the Aadhaar linked to a bank account as a financial address to do electronic money transfers from one Aadhaar number to another.
Company data for NPCI
Unless an Aadhaar is linked to the account, the AEPS cannot access the bank account. Linking a PAN to the Aadhaar will have the same effect as linking the Aadhaar to a bank account as the PAN is already linked to the bank account. Such accounts become Aadhaar enabled. Aadhaar enabled bank accounts are ready to be used by the AEPS for Aadhaar to Aadhaar money transfers.
Linking an Aadhaar to a bank account is done through a process called as “seeding” an Aadhaar number to a bank account. After receiving the Aadhaar number from the customer, the bank uploads such numbers’ into a “NPCI mapper” or a repository of Aadhaar numbers and Institution Identification Number (IIN) numbers used for the purpose of routing transactions to the destination banks. The IIN is a unique 6-digit number issued by NPCI to the participating bank. If you or anyone else seed your Aadhaar with another bank account, the NPCI mapper is overwritten with the new banks’ IIN. Money transferred to an Aadhaar number, using the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System, gets transferred to the bank account linked to the Aadhaar number at the branch recognised by the IIN.
A money launderer can transfer money to an account linked to an alternate IIN and then re-seed the NPCI’s mapper with the original IIN for the Aadhaar number, completely wiping out any trace of money to the alternate IIN. Like transactions of bearer shares in Panama, such money transfers becomes no different from a hawala[4] transaction between real parties who remain anonymous or benami[5].
Your Aadhaar number can be used to facilitate such benami money transfers. If these money transfers linked to your Aadhaar number are detected by investigation officers or tax authorities, you, not the real operator will be held on suspicion of economic offences.
The NPCI’s idea of Aadhaar to Aadhaar banking itself is flawed. It is surprising if the RBI has licensed this payment system under the Payment and Settlements Act.
All money is ultimately stored in bank accounts and not in the name of a person. Nowhere in the world does one transfer money to a person, you transfer it to a persons account. Money transfers to and from a bank account makes every money transfer traceable from source to destination making money laundering difficult, if not impossible.
Hawala schemes make money transfers untraceable by eliminating the bank accounts. Money transfers that, like the hawala, are based on the premise that you do not share an account number, with someone transferring money to you, are inherently flawed in auditability as they wipe out the money trail.
The idea of a mapper, as used by NPCI’s AEPS, does not allow for instructions from sender but relies on periodic update of IIN in the NPCI’s table mapping Aadhaar numbers from banks. As multiple banks have to upload the Aadhaar numbers seeded with accounts held by them, this cannot guarantee desired results.
Perhaps the worst aspect of the mapper is that it slices the business process and outsources parts. This destroys the responsibility of the payment system from any single party as was in the case of NEFT or RTGS. Neither the NPCI, the UIDAI or the banks are responsible in such money transfers. They merely provide “look-up” services. In this system, a single compromised or rogue bank branch, or the perpetuator’s ability to exploit a good one, is enough to siphon off subsidy, park black money or take bribes.
Governments across India had been using the RBI’s own payment system, the NEFT or RTGS, to undertake electronic money transfers. This is also evidenced by the fact that Aadhaar Leaks has exposed that bank details are already present in every record of the leaked data. There is absolutely no reason to switch public payments from NEFT to AEPS, run by a non-government company.
The replacement of a time tested standard of electronic money transfers under government regulation by a non-standard payment system run by a non-government company raises several serious questions of national and public interest, propriety and possible conflicts of interest.
Preventing disaster
If the government and the Supreme Court implement the wisdom of 7 orders of the Supreme Court of India on the use of Aadhaar, they can yet save the country from disaster resulting from the colonisation of India by the new East India Companies or the private interests driving Aadhaar.
In its first order of September 23, 2011 the Supreme Court had indicated that “no person should suffer for not getting the Aadhaar card inspite of the fact that some authority had issued a circular making it mandatory and when any person applies to get the Aadhaar Card voluntarily”.
On August 11, 2015, the 3 member bench restricted the use of Aadhaar and indicated that it may not be used for any other purpose.
On October 15, 2015, a 5 member bench led by the Chief Justice had emphasised that “the Aadhaar card Scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this Court”. It had restricted the voluntary use of Aadhaar to public distribution system (PDS) Scheme, the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) distribution scheme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), National Social Assistance Programme (Old Age Pensions, Widow Pensions, Disability Pensions), Prime Minister’s Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) and Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO).
In the meantime, following Mahatma Gandhi’s footsteps and refusing to link Aadhaar to anything may be the only option left for you.
On 10 January 1908 Mahatma Gandhi was arrested for the first time in South Africa for refusing to carry an obligatory identity document card commonly known as the ‘pass’.
[1] Aadhaar is a 12 digit random number assigned by India’s Unique Identification Authority of India to unaudited and unverified demographic and biometric information submitted by private enrollers. [2] Accounts and transactions undertaken using a ghost or a duplicate identity are called benami. [3] Permanent Account Number or PAN is a number used to track financial transactions and file income tax returns in India. [4] Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system that works outside formal banking systems. [5] This was first highlighted in September 2014 in http://www.moneylife.in/article/how-aadhaar-linkage-can-destroy-banks/38736.html
On August 24th 2017, WikiLeaks published secret documents from the ExpressLane project of the CIA pertaining to the cyber operations the OTS (Office of Technical Services), a branch within the CIA conducts against liaison services. The OTS provides a biometric collection system to liaison services around the world with the expectation for sharing of the biometric takes collected on the systems. Additionally, the CIA has developed ExpressLane - a covert information collection tool to secretly exfiltrate data collections from these systems without the knowledge of the vendors as well.
ExpressLane installs and runs covertly behind a benign splash screen indicating a software upgrade and is used when OTS agents perform on site upgrades on the biometric system. The installation raises no suspicions other than the minor notices which don't appear to be out of the ordinary for a software installation.
The core components of the OTS system are based on products from Cross Match, a US company specializing in biometric software for law enforcement and the Intelligence Community. The company hit the headlines in 2011 when it was reported that the US military used a Cross Match product to identify Osama bin Laden during the assassination operation in Pakistan. This company also provides biometrics collection systems for UIDAI's Aadhaar in India.
The response to these revelations in India has been astonishingly muted. A foreign government having access to confidential and highly accurate information on citizens of India amounts to an attack on India's sovereignty. The existence of Aadhaar itself now becomes a government sanctioned weapon against the country and citizens. The Aadhaar must be destroyed.
The few reports in media restrain themselves to very conservative reporting of the actual leaks without committing themselves to stating the implications for the country. This too is concerning, because it indicates an inadequate comprehension of how tech works in the media and renders the media toothless when it comes to providing public oversight on the highly insecure progression of the Digital India project.
On its part, the UIDAI has issued its standard voodoo denials. No explanations, no data, no alarm, no need for any investigations, nothing. Assurances that "all is well, don't worry" is all the UIDAI appears to have on any of the mounting concerns about the Aadhaar being illegally imposed on the citizens of India with blatant disregard to repeated orders of the Supreme Court. And of course, flat out lies - the hallmark of anything supported by the Modi government. Here are some claims debunked.
Aadhaar system has stringent security features to prevent any unauthorised transmission of data.
And here we thought UIDAI filed a case against Abhinav Srivastava, co-founder ofQarth Technologies Pvt. Ltd, who released an entire app that made unauthorized use of Aadhaar data e-kyc, then let him go, because he didn't have bad intentions. And oh, they complained about unauthorized access and then also claimed that no data was breached. We get it. There was no breach. He was using an authorized api without being authorized. No breach. Just reading news on the UIDAI is enough to give anyone who understands tech security high blood pressure.
No, Aadhaar most certainly doesn't have stringent security features to prevent unauthorized transmission of data. Aadhaar devices were not even encrypted till well after UIDAI started claiming 90% enrolment across the country (another dubious claim, for another day).
“Some vested interests are trying to spread misinformation that since ‘Cross Match’ is one of many devices which are being used in biometric devices by various registrars and agencies in Aadhaar ecosystem, the biometrics being captured for Aadhaar are allegedly unauthorisedly accessed by others.”
This is complete bullshit. The vast majority of people objecting to Aadhaar have nothing to gain from its failure (other than national and personal security). In contrast, the vast majority of people defending Aadhaar without any data, independent audit, robust explanations of technology and worse are invariably employed by UIDAI or its affiliates or have founded them (or, in a recent trend, are anonymous handles - I wonder who, other than Sharad Sharma could be behind those). Where is the misinformation in CIA being a spy agency, or it being known to engage in illegal and digital spying or it being known to subvert democratic governments in countries? Where is the "misinformation" in a leak of secret documents on a site that so far has never been questioned on the authenticity of leaked information it publishes?
Aadhaar biometric capture system has been “developed within our own country and it has adequate and robust security features to prevent any possibility of any such unauthorised capture and transmission of data regardless of any biometric device that may be used”.
This statement can be true, only if the UIDAI spokesman is a US national, because even the UIDAI website offers driver downloads for Cross Match and L-1 devices. The same Cross Match and L-1 that have apparently got biometric capture systems from the OTS branch of CIA on the understanding of data sharing. And the Express Lane is the data theft on top of that.
“In addition, there are many other rigorous security features and processes within UIDAI ensuring that no biometric data of any individual is unauthorized accessed by anyone in any manner whatsoever,”
Golden rule in C-Sec is: If physical access is compromised, everything is gone. Wikileaks talks about physical access. It is about installing a backdoor on the source where biometric is acquired at the device driver level. Encryption argument is useless in that case. But encryption != Security.
(update: UIDAI has made some vodoo argument about how access is secured on UIDAI premises and what not. It is nonsense. Aadhaar data is collected out in the real world where the espionage would be happening. Whether UIDAI pickles the data or freezes in some on premises further access to foreign companies it makes no difference to that)
How much Aadhaar data and how much access do foreign BSPs have?
And this information is from an RTI filed by Col. Thomas, that the BSP (Biometric Service Provider) "may have access to personal data of the purchaser (UID), and/or a third party or any resident of India..." Further, Clause 3, which deals with privacy, says that the BSP could "collect, use, transfer, store and process the data".
Excerpt from UIDAI contract with Biometric Service providers
In other words, the UIDAI has been deliberately undermining Indian security using Indian funds and flat out lying about its activities. The entire organization must be dismantled and its leaders investigated.
A 9 judge bench uninamously declared privacy to be a fundamental right
This opens a whole new can of worms and is a threat to many of your favorite ways of bullying.
Aadhaar is going to go down. One way or the other. This judgment is just the start.
A battle in a war against Aadhaar. An Aadhaar that stops at nothing, respects no rights, refuses to cross no lines in rendering both national security and individual at risk.
Imposing Aadhaar is clearly an act that puts India at risk of big data surveillance.
Citizens were conned into getting Aadhaar as something that would help them get their rights. Fact is, having an Aadhaar entitles you for NOTHING. Imposing an Aadhaar DENIES you rights you already had.
It is still not too late to be on the right side of history. Roll back Aadhaar. Then you will not have to LIE when you claim that you saved the country from it when that house of cards comes down. #IssuedInPublicInterest
Otherwise, prepare for war. Aadhaar will be fought all the way by citizens who refuse to bow down to profiteers and foreign intelligence agencies. Who refuse to see the poor starve because the government is fine with it and has other priorities that prefers them to suffer rather than disobey an invasive dikkat. You will not be able to lay this country at the feet of those who want to control it. Try all you want. LIE all you want.
If you really are interested in putting India first, like you demand from random others as proof of patriotism, stop throwing India under the feet of your masters. Stop allowing people to trample the interest of its citizens. Stop allowing people to weaken its laws, create social divisions and drive the country to civil war just because a polarized country is profit for some. Stop attacking those trying to draw attention to important issues and help them get fixed instead. A country beongs to all the citizens. ANYONE who tells you otherwise is using you and attacking your country. Not us. Vidyut
Aadhaar exposes citizens to unacceptable risk
The government knows. It does not care if the entire life earnings of someone are at risk for its goals. You know this. I know this. The rest is hogwash to make your poliitical masters appear blameless in the eyes of voters. When you do it, you are harming the country.
In a landmark challenge to Aadhaar on the grounds of privacy being an inalienable fundamental right, a 9 judge bench of the Supreme Court of India upholds Right To Privacy as an Intrinsic Part Of Right To Life And Personal Liberty
Supreme Court of India has once again come to rescue the citizens of India by declaring that right to privacy is a fundamental right. This is a big jolt to a government which was turning itself to a surveillance state by intruding every aspect of the life of the individual. This decision was made unanimously reflecting the absolute legal voice on the issue.
The decision was given by a big bench of nine judges who ruled that right to privacy is an intrinsic part of Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21 and entire Part III of the Constitution.
The part III is related to the fundamental rights which have been given to people to live their life as they wish for and develop their personality in full manner. The decision is linked to the government’s effort to make Aadhaar mandatory for the social welfare policies; government also amended Income Tax Act to make Aadhaar mandatory for the IT which SC accepted as valid but government was attempting to extend Aadhaar based surveillance almost in all aspects of the individual’s life. The decision may help to halt this process though SC has to deliver decision on Aadhaar later but is now established that Indian government cannot be a surveillance state as the privacy of the individual cannot be explored and penetrated in absolute manner extending in all aspects of private domain of the person.
The decision has thus overruled the M P Sharma verdict of 1950( six judges judgment) and that of Kharak Singh of 1960 (eight judges) judgments of the same court that right to privacy is not protected under the Constitution..
The decision has been based on article 21 of the fundamental rights. The article is the most interpreted article of the constitution as SC has interpreted it in different dimensions of human life. The article states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” In the same article by 86th Constitution Amendment, 2002 the 21A was added stating that ‘under 21A the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.’
The Supreme Court has taken a wider view of the right to personal liberty that it cannot be controlled by the administrative fiats and the legislations. Aadhaar issue will be heavily impacted after the decision and its decision will be dealt during the coming time but the recent decision has illuminated the hopes that SC will also limit the government powers with respect to Aadhaar. It was felt by the citizens that compulsion of Aadhaar was unnecessarily placing them under stress. From banks to entrance examinations Aadhaar was becoming a compulsory identity. In several places the old person s were faced with the problem of not getting their pensions as they were not in a position to attach the Aadhaar cards. The practical problem was that they were so old that their fingerprints did not appear or were not in position to Aadhaar camp where these cards were being prepared due to old age or no one support them to take them to the camps. Several old women have complained about this sorry state of affairs.
Government did not take a flexible view and attempted to monitor every action of the individual. The fear was that Aadhaar compulsion might put the person always under stress. That day was not far away when government could ask the person attach Aadhaar whenever anyone you purchased a newspaper or visited a restaurant for a dinner or stayed in a hospital or was hanging out in a park.
In the societies where governments are fearful of the force of the citizens such steps are contemplated. Supreme Court by its decision has placed the limits on any malafide intention and has empowered the citizens of the country.
Supreme Court is really a custodian of humane values and lives of the Indian citizens. Constitution is paramount and so the WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA. Supreme Court has upheld it and no power can dilute it is now a well established fact.
