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Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4 || Part 5

People who had come from the war zones, from Lalgarh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa, described the police repression, the arrests, the torture, the killing, the corruption, and the fact that in places like Orissa, they seemed to take orders directly from the officials who worked for the mining companies. People described the dubious, malign role being played by certain NGOs funded by aid agencies wholly devoted to furthering corporate prospects. Again and again they spoke of how in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh activists as well as ordinary people—anyone who was seen to be a dissenter—were being branded Maoists and imprisoned. They said that this, more than anything else, was pushing people to take up arms and join the Maoists. They asked how a government that professed its inability to resettle even a fraction of the fifty million people who had been displaced by “development” projects was suddenly able to identify 1,40,000 hectares of prime land to give to industrialists for more than 300 Special Economic Zones, India’s onshore tax havens for the rich. They asked what brand of justice the Supreme Court was practising when it refused to review the meaning of ‘public purpose’ in the Land Acquisition Act even when it knew that the government was forcibly acquiring land in the name of ‘public purpose’ to give to private corporations. They asked why when the government says that “the Writ of the State must run”, it seems to only mean that police stations must be put in place. Not schools or clinics or housing, or clean water, or a fair price for forest produce, or even being left alone and free from the fear of the police—anything that would make people’s lives a little easier. They asked why the ‘Writ of the State’ could never be taken to mean justice.

There was a time, perhaps 10 years ago, when in meetings like these, people were still debating the model of “development” that was being thrust on them by the New Economic Policy. Now the rejection of that model is complete. It is absolute. Everyone from the Gandhians to the Maoists agree on that. The only question now is, what is the most effective way to dismantle it?

An old college friend of a friend, a big noise in the corporate world, had come along for one of the meetings out of morbid curiosity about a world he knew very little about. Even though he had disguised himself in a Fabindia kurta, he couldn’t help looking (and smelling) expensive. At one point, he leaned across to me and said, “Someone should tell them not to bother. They won’t win this one. They have no idea what they’re up against. With the kind of money that’s involved here, these companies can buy ministers and media barons and policy wonks, they can run their own NGOs, their own militias, they can buy whole governments. They’ll even buy the Maoists. These good people here should save their breath and find something better to do.”

When people are being brutalised, what ‘better’ thing is there for them to do than to fight back? It’s not as though anyone’s offering them a choice, unless it’s to commit suicide, like the 1,80,000 farmers caught in a spiral of debt have done. (Am I the only one who gets the distinct feeling that the Indian establishment and its representatives in the media are far more comfortable with the idea of poor people killing themselves in despair than with the idea of them fighting back?)

For several years, people in Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal—some of them Maoists, many not—have managed to hold off the big corporations. The question now is—how will Operation Green Hunt change the nature of their struggle? What exactly are the fighting people up against?

It’s true that, historically, mining companies have almost always won their battles against local people. Of all corporations, leaving aside the ones that make weapons, they
probably have the most merciless past. They are cynical, battle-hardened campaigners and when people say ‘Jaan denge par jameen nahin denge (We’ll give away our lives, but never our land)’, it probably bounces off them like a light drizzle on a bomb shelter. They’ve heard it before, in a thousand different languages, in a hundred different countries.

Right now in India, many of them are still in the First Class Arrivals lounge, ordering cocktails, blinking slowly like lazy predators, waiting for the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) they have signed—some as far back as 2005—to materialise into real money. But four years in a First Class lounge is enough to test the patience of even the truly tolerant. There’s only that much space they’re willing to make for the elaborate, if increasingly empty, rituals of democratic practice: the (rigged) public hearings, the (fake) Environmental Impact Assessments, the (purchased) clearances from various ministries, the long-drawn-out court cases. Even phony democracy is time-consuming. And time, for industrialists, is money.

So what kind of money are we talking about? In their seminal, soon-to-be-published work, Out of This Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminum Cartel, Samarendra Das and Felix Padel say that the financial value of the bauxite deposits of Orissa alone is 2.27 trillion dollars. (More than twice India’s Gross Domestic Product). That was at 2004 prices. At today’s prices it would be about 4 trillion dollars. A trillion has 12 zeroes.

Of this, officially the government gets a royalty of less than 7 per cent. Quite often, if the mining company is a known and recognised one, the chances are that, even though the ore is still in the mountain, it will have already been traded on the futures market. So, while for the adivasis the mountain is still a living deity, the fountainhead of life and faith, the keystone of the ecological health of the region, for the corporation, it’s just a cheap storage facility. Goods in storage have to be accessible. From the corporation’s point of view, the bauxite will have to come out of the mountain. If it can’t be done peacefully, then it will have to be done violently. Such are the pressures and the exigencies of the free market.

That’s just the story of the bauxite in Orissa. Expand the four trillion dollars to include the value of the millions of tonnes of high-quality iron ore in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and the 28 other precious mineral resources, including uranium, limestone, dolomite, coal, tin, granite, marble, copper, diamond, gold, quartzite, corundum, beryl, alexandrite, silica, fluorite and garnet. Add to that the power plants, the dams, the highways, the steel and cement factories, the aluminium smelters, and all the other infrastructure projects that are part of the hundreds of MoUs (more than 90 in Jharkhand alone) that have been signed. That gives us a rough outline of the scale of the operation and the desperation of the stakeholders. The forest once known as the Dandakaranya, which stretches from West Bengal through Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, parts of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, is home to millions of India’s tribal people. The media has taken to calling it the Red corridor or the Maoist corridor. It could just as accurately be called the MoUist corridor. It doesn’t seem to matter at all that the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution provides protection to adivasi people and disallows the alienation of their land. It looks as though the clause is there only to make the Constitution look good—a bit of window-dressing, a slash of make-up. Scores of corporations, from relatively unknown ones to the biggest mining companies and steel manufacturers in the world, are in the fray to appropriate adivasi homelands—the Mittals, Jindals, Tata, Essar, Posco, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and, of course, Vedanta.
There’s an MoU on every mountain, river and forest glade. We’re talking about social and environmental engineering on an unimaginable scale. And most of this is secret. It’s not in the public domain. Somehow I don’t think that the plans that are afoot to destroy one of the world’s most pristine forests and ecosystems, as well as the people who live in it, will be discussed at the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Our 24-hour news channels that are so busy hunting for macabre stories of Maoist violence—and making them up when they run out of the real thing—seem to have no interest at all in this side of the story. I wonder why?

Perhaps it’s because the development lobby to which they are so much in thrall says the mining industry will ratchet up the rate of GDP growth dramatically and provide employment to the people it displaces. This does not take into account the catastrophic costs of environmental damage. But even on its own narrow terms, it is simply untrue. Most of the money goes into the bank accounts of the mining corporations. Less than 10 per cent comes to the public exchequer. A very tiny percentage of the displaced people get jobs, and those who do, earn slave-wages to do humiliating, backbreaking work. By caving in to this paroxysm of greed, we are bolstering other countries’ economies with our ecology.

4

Again, the time is come to talk about the AFSPA and again, the rhetoric is the same on all sides. Another classic Indian stalemate.

Omar Abdullah has taken on himself to get the AFSPA revoked from some parts of Kashmir at least, and wants the Army to give him options other than "No".

The Army, on its part is adamant that revoking the AFSPA will be the equivalent of giving terrorists free rein - a claim that is scoffed by people who want the AFSPA revoked, but a claim extremely likely to be true by the estimates of many people well-versed with counter-insurgency operations.

Human rights advocates persistently point out abuses by the Army as a reason to revoke the AFSPA, conveniently measuring human rights by the standards of a secure region and protests by the standards of a disputed region. They also consistently ignore that the larger number of human rights abuses is by militants which is possible to get higher with revocation of AFSPA. The stand here seems to be anti-state in the name of human rights rather than a well-considered focus on human rights, which could have created suggestions with better possibilities to work, since this group is credible in the eyes of both state and people.

Kashmiris themselves have diverse objectives, and no single perspective can be considered as representative of all.

Considering all these voices and their multiple desired outcomes, it remains important to identify areas all can agree on and consolidate those.

One such area is human rights. Whether the Army needs AFSPA or not, every side of this debate agrees that civilians have rights and they must be respected. There clearly needs to be reform that allows regular proscecution of soldiers engaging in human rights abuse. Rape, extra-judicial killings and such cannot be called counter-insurgency, and there needs to be a divorce from the concept of all pervading exemption from prosecution.

The Army claims to have suspended several of the accused, and it is a good beginning, but really a suspension is irrelevant. It is an Army matter on whether the soldier's behavior is acceptable in service or not. It cannot be considered justice for a rape or murder. In my view, the punishment for these should be the same as for any other rapist or murderer and from a civil court, unless the Army thinks it covers rapes and extra judicial killings as a part of the job description. Whether existing law provides for this or if it should be amended or a new law created, I don't know, but this is important.

Understandably there is concern over soldiers being framed, and the Army can and should provide competent lawyers if they believe a soldier is being framed, but keeping non-counter-insurgency harm to civilians out of the jurisdiction of civil courts leaves them with no recourse. The Army cannot live in a place and flaunt its laws too!

At the same time, the separatists need to tone down the rhetoric a lot, if they expect their concerns to be taken seriously. The story of victimization may be true, but as a story of a special victimization of Kashmir, it doesn't wash. Human rights abuse is very common all over India and indeed South Asia at the very least. If they imagine Pakistan, China or even an independent Kashmir would be any better, they need to get a dose of reality here. It needs fought and it needs fixed, yes, but is it a Kashmir special? Only if you know no other place than Kashmir, and no other logic than brainwash.

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Black Humor Break:

Human rights abuse in Kashmir by the state should be considered as the true sign that the state considers Kashmiris their own. See how Baba Ramdev was attacked in the capital of the country. A Hindu, Brahmin, no less. We do it everywhere. Protest anything, and you get squashed. That is how India treats dissent. You are perfectly Indian, not to worry.

End Black Humor
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It also isn't an Army speciality. False encounters have been done by police and militants. Rapes have been done by absolutely every occupation man has known in far greater proportion than our Army. Read news of cops, for example. So revoking the AFSPA may not be the miracle cure it is advertized as.

On the other hand, militancy being the reason for Army presence is wearing thin. It is Pakistan's stated policy to promote cross border terrorism. The Army itself reports camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir being intact, routine infiltrations and cover fire from Pakistani posts. There is absolutely no indication that Pakistan will change its mind over this. Ever. In fact, Hafiz Saeed & Co are openly advocating more mayhem in recent days. This can be considered a permanent feature of having Pakistan for a neighbour. "Can we consider an Army in civilian areas a permanent feature?" - is the question.

While we are impacted by Pakistani actions, we are not responsible for them. We are responsible for our actions. And choosing indefinite Army control for a region doesn't seem to be one of our brighter ideas.

The Army's concern about pockets of militancy seems valid and makes complete sense and is not something that should be taken lightly - particularly by those who claim an interest in human rights and safety.

So there needs to be another way. And it cannot be military, it needs to be political and administrative. There needs to be some kind of plan for handing over control of the region to local police - including counter-insurgency. Possibly a specialist police force or strengthening an existing one. That might mean training, equipment, etc. With the intention that the Army will not be expected to come in and fight fires that get lit once it exits civilian areas. When this is done, it will become safe to revoke the AFSPA.

Lack of insurgency alone cannot be enough as Omar Abdullah seems to be thinking, because without the capacity with local forces, the revoking of the AFSPA will indeed be an invitation to militants in that case. If that happens, the Army will have to be back too and we'll have this same debate over and over.

This should be planned well and in terms of a permanent administrative solution in a sensitive area.

There will need to be provisions for the Army supply routes and transit bases and the rights of the soldiers to their protection by the local forces outside camp/convoy perimeters and themselves inside. There will obviously need to be the provision to repel attacks and give immediate chase to perpetrators - AFSPA or not. There will be border areas under the control of the Army. There will obviously need to be interfaces between local forces and Army...

It could prove to be a much welcome image boost for both politicians and Army. It will be much needed relief for soldiers from the stress of living with an unseen enemy among civilians. It will be a big breather for civilians to be secured by a machinery they can challenge if wronged. Also, police in general have far more of their role geared to dealing with civilian problems. The Army simply are not geared for that the way cops are. AFSPA isn't the only gap in function.

But yes, getting the Army out of the hair of civilians one way or the other, is an important goal to take up. The Army cannot be turned into an administrative solution. Nor can the actions of a neighbouring country be considered adequate reason for permanent Army control in our own.